Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the General Secretary of the Supreme Leader has repeatedly stressed that leading cadres should be good at using the method of bottom line thinking, prepare everything from the bad and strive for the best results. In the history of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Mao Zedong is a strategic master who is good at using bottom line thinking. In his "conclusion" made at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China in May 1945, he listed "seventeen difficulties" that we might encounter in one breath in the face of the excellent situation of "victory" in the Anti-Japanese War, and put forward our countermeasures accordingly, which is a typical example of successfully using the bottom line thinking.
"We should build our policy on the worst possibility."
By the time the Seventh National Congress was held, great changes had taken place in the Communist Party of China (CPC). After Yan’ an rectification, the whole party realized a great awakening in thought and action, and achieved new unity and unity; It has become a powerful political party with rich experience and 1.21 million party member, and has become the focus of China people’s resistance to Japan and national salvation, the focus of China people’s liberation and the focus of defeating the aggressors and building a new China. The people’s army led by the Party has grown to 910,000, the militia to 2.2 million, and the population of the liberated areas to 95.5 million, and it has received assistance from the people of the whole country, people all over the world, especially the Soviet Union. In short, as Mao Zedong said, "the Communist Party of China (CPC) has never been so powerful, the revolutionary base areas have never had such a large population and such a large army, the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s prestige among the people in the Japanese and Kuomintang areas is also the highest now, and the revolutionary forces of the Soviet Union and the people of other countries are also the greatest now. Under these conditions, it should be said that it is entirely possible to defeat the aggressors and build a new China. "
The international and domestic situation is bright and beautiful, and the mast of "victory" seems to have jumped over the horizon. However, just as people were preparing to cheer loudly and celebrate the "victory", on May 31, Mao Zedong unexpectedly expressed his support for someone’s suggestion that China might become a semi-colony of the United States after the war in his seven "conclusions", stressing that it was necessary to "prepare for losses" and "prepare for difficulties" while seeing "light". He also listed the possible "seventeen difficulties" in one breath:
The first one is "foreign abuse". British and American newspapers and news agencies now scold communist party, "The more we develop in the future, the stronger they will scold". Second, "domestic abuse". It is a big curse, not a small one, calling us "sabotaging the war of resistance against Japan, endangering the country, killing and setting fires, communist hetaerism, being inhuman, and so on". Third, "they are going to occupy several large base areas." Article 4, "They wiped out tens of thousands of troops". In the future, our army is likely to grow to 1.5 million, leaving 1 million "one third lost by him"; He "got rid of half" and left 750 thousand. Article 5, "The puppet troops welcome Chiang Kai-shek". The puppet army "transformed itself, hung Chiang Kai-shek’s flag, welcomed Chiang Kai-shek and welcomed Yan Xishan, which made us very difficult." Where the Japanese withdrew, they immediately occupied it, and we were too late. " Article 6, "Civil War". Seventh, "out of Scobie, China becomes Greece" (Scobie was the British commander stationed in Greece at that time. In December 1944, Scobie commanded the British army and assisted the Greek government in attacking the Greek People’s Liberation Army, which had bravely resisted the Germans for a long time, and massacred the Greek patriotic people). That is to say, foreign forces interfered in China’s internal affairs and helped Chiang Kai-shek beat us. Article 8: "No recognition of Poland" means that the status of our party is "not recognized". Article 9, "Run away and scatter tens of thousands of party member". In the future, if the situation is not good, "Chiang Kai-shek and Scobie will be attacked from both sides, shooting everywhere, and some party member will turn back, run away and disperse." We’re going to disperse a third or more.Tenth, "pessimism and fatigue appear in the party." Eleventh, "natural disasters are prevalent, and the bare land is thousands of miles away." Article 12, "economic difficulties". Thirteenth, "the enemy forces are concentrated in North China". That is, "the Japanese army withdrew from South China and Central China and withdrew all its troops to North China", and "proposed the conditions of peaceful compromise and made peace with Britain and the United States", squeezing our party and the Eighth Route Army. Article 14, "The Kuomintang carried out an assassination plot to assassinate our responsible comrades". Article 15: "The leading organs of the Party have different opinions", and there are "many discussions, disagreement, dissatisfaction, etc." within the Party. Article 16, "The international proletariat will not help us for a long time". Article 17, "Other unexpected things".
When enumerating these difficulties, Mao Zedong also criticized that "there was a tradition in our party that we could not talk about difficulties, and always said that the enemy always collapsed and we were a great victory". "Now we must have full confidence to estimate the light and also have full confidence to estimate the darkness"."We should establish our policy in the worst possible way", especially for the senior responsible cadres of the Party, and we should be mentally prepared to deal with very difficult and unfavorable situations.He said:"If we are not prepared not to imagine such difficulties, we will not be able to deal with them when they come, but with such preparation, it will be easy to handle affairs."
"Don’t repeat the mistake of being proud when you win."
Faced with the bright future of "bright" and "victory", why did Mao Zedong pour a cold water head-on, talk about "seventeen difficulties" in one breath, and repeatedly emphasize "preparing for losses"? The reason why Mao Zedong did this is not aimless or posturing, but has profound historical and practical basis.
Historically, our party has made many mistakes because of "victory" and "loss" because of "pride", leaving a painful lesson. In order to prepare for the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, from 1943 to 1944, senior cadres of the whole Party seriously discussed the historical issues of the Party. On April 12, 1944, at the meeting of senior cadres in Yan ‘an and in the first lecture of the Central Party School on May 20, Mao Zedong made a systematic review and analysis of the party’s lessons in this regard, pointing out: "There have been several times in the history of our party that we have shown great pride and suffered losses." He listed four specific lessons: "The first time was in the first half of 1927. At that time, when the Northern Expeditionary Army arrived in Wuhan, some comrades became proud and thought they were so proud that they forgot that the Kuomintang was going to attack us. As a result, he made mistakes in Chen Duxiu’s line, which led to the failure of this revolution. The second time was in 1930. The Red Army took advantage of the conditions of Jiang Fengyan’s war to win some battles, and some comrades became proud and self-righteous. As a result, he made mistakes in Li Lisan’s line and suffered some losses to the revolutionary forces. The third time was in 1931. The Red Army broke the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign, and then the people of the whole country launched a vigorous anti-Japanese movement in the face of the Japanese attack, and some comrades became proud and thought they were great. As a result, we made more serious mistakes in the line, and lost about 90% of the revolutionary forces that we worked hard to gather. The fourth time was in 1938. With the anti-Japanese war, the United front has been established, and some comrades have become proud and self-righteous.As a result, I made some mistakes similar to the Chen Duxiu route. This time, the revolutionary work in those places most affected by these comrades’ wrong ideas has suffered great losses. For this reason, he demanded in his speech: "All Party comrades should take these pride and mistakes as a warning", let go of the "burden" of "arrogance" and "don’t repeat the mistakes of pride when winning". Previously, Guo Moruo’s "Three Hundred Years Festival of Jiashen" was issued as a rectification document for the whole party to study. On November 21, 1944, in a letter to Guo Moruo, Mao Zedong wrote: "A small victory is pride, and a big victory is more proud. It is worth noting how to avoid this kind of problem." He himself is even more"Be conscientious, for fear that something will go wrong, but maybe something will come out from somewhere.", request"What mistakes have you seen? I hope to know at any time."
Judging from the actual situation of the party, although the party and its leading team have developed as never before, the China revolution has not yet won. We have more than 900,000 troops, but they are not centralized, but divided and can only fight the sparrow war. Our base area has a population of more than 90 million, but it is not a whole, but it is also divided; Our enemies are still very strong, including the powerful Japanese imperialism and the Kuomintang. Although these two enemies are not the same type, they are "one guarding our front door and the other guarding our back door". Compared with the enemy, our strength is very small, and there are still difficulties ahead. Our situation is still very harsh. All these also require us to.We should not only "strive bravely" but also "be modest and prudent", and we should not repeat the historical saying that when we were young, we were comfortable and had nothing to do, but when we were big, our brains swelled up, our heads swelled up, we became proud and our hearts became impatient.The mistake.
After talking about 17 difficulties, Mao Zedong then talked about the "bright side" of eight aspects to ensure that "we must win", including:First, "temporary loss, final victory"; Second, "if you fail here, you will win there", "If the east is not bright, the west will be bright, and if it is dark, the south will have the north"; Third, "some people ran away and some people came"; Fourth, "some people are dead and some people are alive"; Fifth, "learn to do economic work when you are in economic difficulties" and "do it yourself and develop production"; Sixth, "to overcome natural disasters, Taihang has experience, and communist party will catch locusts"; Seventh, "disputes within the party give us exercise, and a big dispute is a big exercise"; Eighth, "learn to be self-reliant without international assistance", and so on.
On the basis of estimating both "difficulties" and "light", the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China formulated a set of correct lines, programs and strategies around the party’s central task, which laid a solid political, ideological and organizational foundation for the party’s leadership to win the victory of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the victory of the new-democratic revolution throughout the country.
"Now that we have won the world, we still have to imagine from the worst possibility."
Preparing for the worst, in the final analysis, is to get the best future and results.
Shortly after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, some of the "seventeen difficulties" envisioned by Mao Zedong at the Seventh National Congress really met, some of them happened, and even some "other unexpected things" appeared. For example, less than two years after the closing of the Seventh National Congress, Yan ‘an, the seat of the Central Committee, was occupied by Kuomintang troops, which was unexpected when the Seventh National Congress was held. However, it is precisely because of our mental preparation to deal with all difficulties that we voluntarily abandoned Yan ‘an and regained Yan ‘an. Mao Zedong’s original idea of "fighting for five years or so to fundamentally overthrow the Kuomintang" was finally achieved in only three years.
In Mao Zedong’s view, everything should be prepared from the most difficult and the worst, and strive for the best result. Such a thinking method, working method and leadership method should always be adhered to, whether in the revolutionary war era or in the period of peaceful construction. On January 27th, 1957, in his speech at the meeting of party secretaries of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, Mao Zedong said: "I think we should prepare for something big. If you are prepared for something big, it may not happen. If you are not prepared for something big, trouble will come out. The development of things is nothing more than two possibilities: good and bad. We must estimate two possibilities for both international and domestic problems. You said it would be peaceful this year, maybe it would be peaceful. However, it is not good for you to put your work on the basis of this estimate, and you should imagine it on the worst basis. Internationally, it is nothing more than fighting a world war and throwing atomic bombs. At home, there was nothing more than a national chaos, the "Hungarian incident", and millions of people rose up against us, occupied hundreds of counties, and fought in Beijing. We will only go to Yan ‘an again, and that’s where we came from. We have lived in Beijing for seven years, and what if we are invited back to Yan ‘an in the eighth year? Everyone is crying, crying? …..’ seven’, I said to estimate to seventeen difficulties, including bare land thousands of miles, famine, no food, all the county lost. We have made such a full estimate, so we are always in the initiative. Now that we have won the world, we still have to imagine from the worst possible. "
In his speech at the Central Working Conference in Chengdu on March 25th, 1958, Mao Zedong proposed to prepare for the unexpected. He said: We didn’t expect the international criticism of Stalin and the Polish-Hungarian incident in 1956, and there were some things that we didn’t expect at home. What is unexpected in the future? What may be unexpected at home and abroad? For example, if there is a world war, the madman wants to fight, and the atomic bomb will smash all of us, there is no way. What problems will happen in the Soviet Union? He once again talked about the "seventeen difficulties" mentioned in the past, saying: I remember that at the Seventh National Congress, seventeen were listed, among which "a thousand miles away in bare land" was a drought; There is also a loss of all county towns, and we only have villages. He asked the party groups of all provinces and ministries to talk about unexpected dangers that may occur at home and abroad and make a list, not 17, but 16. He said: If we are not prepared, when that thing comes, we will be worse. For example, a few leaders in Xizang may defect, and the hearts of the upper class are perfunctory to us in India, Britain and the United States, so we can make a list.
Unfortunately, with the gradual "Left" deviation of the Party’s guiding ideology for socialist construction, we have seriously underestimated the long-term, arduous and complex nature of China’s socialist construction and underestimated the "worst possible". We have become proud and underestimated our enemy. In the course of hard exploration of the road to socialist construction, we have made mistakes again, suffered big losses and left a serious lesson. This is what we still need to reflect on and "take a warning" today.
Everything is established in advance, and it is abolished if it is not foreseen.Mao Zedong’s thinking method of "establishing our policy in the worst possible way" and the "seventeen difficulties" listed provide us with an example of persisting in and making good use of the bottom line thinking to seek business.At present, China’s economic and social development is in a critical period of "three-phase superposition", and the task of comprehensively deepening reform is arduous. On the journey of thoroughly implementing the "four comprehensive" strategic layout and solidly advancing the goal of "two hundred years", we should keep a clear head, start with the worst in everything, imagine all kinds of possibilities, "make it happen before it happens", make a good "first move", play a good initiative and properly solve all kinds of predictable and unpredictable problems in our career development."The reason why our cause is great is that we have experienced difficulties that are rare in the world and have continued to succeed."All difficulties can’t stop the people of China from striding forward. Seventy-one years ago, when Mao Zedong expounded the future of China at the Seventh National Congress, he said a passage, which I think is still applicable at the end of this article:"We clearly understand that in front of us and the people of China, there are still great difficulties, many obstacles and many detours. However, we also know that we, together with the people of the whole country, will be able to overcome any difficulties and obstacles, so that China’s historical task can be completed. "
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